The Indian Ocean Frontier in the evolving Security Architecture in South Asia
December 27, 2011, 5:21 pm 
Prof. Gamini Keerawella,
Senior Professor of History, University of Peradeniya
Historical Backdrop
Since the birth of maritime civilizations in the ‘ancient orient’, the Indian Ocean had played a crucial role in shaping the historical development in the broader Indian Ocean region. The unique geo-strategic form of the Indian Ocean, being a huge bay surrounded on three sides by a landmass and islands and its regular cross-oceanic monsoon winds, made it a mode of connectivity, a huge moat of security, an infinite supplier of food and occasionally a battleground in the struggle for political and economic hegemony of the maritime centers of civilization spotted around its land frontier and in littoral islands from the dawn of history.
The political and strategic conditions in the Indian Ocean had undergone a crucial change with the arrival of the Portuguese Caravels at the turn of the 15th century. The Portuguese naval entry into the Indian Ocean heralded the colonial phase in the region and the control of the Indian Ocean remained the basis of European colonial domination. The British emerged as the foremost naval and colonial power in the struggle for the mastery of the Eastern seas in the mid 18th century and the Indian Ocean practically became a British lake thereafter. Hegemonic stability based on British naval supremacy and the ‘pax-Britannica’ in its East -of-Suez strategy prevailed in the Indian Ocean until the outbreak of World War II.
In the context of the changed configuration of power in world politics after World War II, the British withdrawal from the Indian Ocean in the period 1945-68 paved the way for superpower naval rivalry in the Indian Ocean in the Cold War context. In the background of past colonial experiences, the changed politico-strategic situation in the Indian Ocean after 1945 linked with the Cold-war competition of the Superpowers was viewed by the regional states that emerged with the process of de-colonization as a serious security concern. The multiple linkages between superpower naval rivalry and the conflict patterns in the region remained the conspicuous feature in the Indian Ocean during the Cold War, but the regional multi-balance of forces generated by the Cold War brought relative stability to the regional sub-systems in the Indian Ocean region despite military facts, puppet governments and proxy wars.
The strategic conditions of the Indian Ocean are once again experiencing a process of change with the end of the Cold War. The dismantling of strategic regional linkages of the super powers that were conceived in the Cold-War context and the reshaping of the strategic relationships of regional powers with extra-regional powers in the post-Cold war environment marked the shift. The emergence of Asian growth centers, the advances in blue water naval and other power projection capabilities of the regional powers, the rapid changes in military technology linked with RMA (Revolution in Military Affairs) and the strengthening of the process associated with Globalization have ushered a new strategic environment and new maritime security concerns and threats in the Indian Ocean. It is in this backdrop that the significance of the Indian Ocean frontier of the evolving security architecture in South Asia needs to be understood.
Geo-political factors of South Asia with the Indian Ocean frontier
In the Indian Ocean basin, the South Asian subcontinent appears most conspicuous due to its central location linking the Eastern and Western flanks of the ocean. As a result, the Indian Ocean invariably set a crucial parameter in South Asian security. As Philip Darby pointed out, in the east-of –Suez naval defense strategy of the British, India had been the keystone of the arch of defense in the Indian Ocean. By the same token, viewing conversely, especially in the evolving politico-strategic environment in the post-Cold War global and regional context, without bringing the Indian Ocean frontier as a key consideration, the totality of the security of South Asia cannot be properly understood.
India claims the second largest population, the fourth largest military establishment and seventh largest territory in the World. The massive Indian naval development in the last two decades and acquisition of deeper blue water naval reach is a crucial factor that brought the Indian Ocean frontier into the center of South Asian security projections more directly. The implications and responses of the regional and extra-regional powers to the Indian Naval growth make the Indian Ocean frontier a key aspect of the South Asian security architecture.
Evolving post-Cold War context of Security architecture
The importance of the Indian Ocean frontier in South Asian security has been brought into focus by certain developments in post-Cold War politico-strategic developments. These developments are vital to identify internal and external dynamics relating to the ‘South Asian security complex’, the term used by Barry Buzan to analyze "relative intensity of security relations that lead to distinctive regional pattern shape by both the distribution of power and historical relations of amity and enmity".
The end of the Cold War did not bring sudden drastic changes in the security dynamics of South Asia. In the changed global environment, however, subtle but decisive transformation in the South Asian security complex is clearly underway. It is moving from the earlier asymmetrical bi-polar conflict formation to a new configuration based on the uni-polar hegemony of India. Some of these changes are not directly related to the end of the Cold war. The continued economic growth in the last two decades has made India the new growth center of Asia, following China. The relative depth of the institutional basis of the Indian state and the vibrant democratic political process has moved India steadily from a ‘weak’ to a ‘strong’ state. At the same time, the continuous internal crisis in Pakistan undermined its ability to maintain even asymmetrical bi-polarity vis-à-vis India in the South Asian security complex. India’s continuous economic growth and rapid advances in her power projection capability have expanded its defense and security parameters to cover the wider Indian Ocean and global space. The new and intimate strategic relationship between India and the United States is reflective of India’s enhanced position in the new constellation of global powers. All these factors, including India’s lead in the IT industry, the sophistication in military related IT technology, the acquisition of state-of the art weapons systems (Air and Naval), its deeper naval reach and punch resulted in gradually transforming the South Asian security complex. In this context, India no loner remains confined to South Asia. That is clearly reflected in its recent foreign policy postures and behaviour and India’s ‘look east’ policy comes in this context. What would be the broader political and strategic implications of India’s economic growth, rising military capability and nuclear tests and also reactions of other key players? It is obvious that the United States and China are compelled to take India seriously as a factor to be reckoned with and as Barry Buzan observed "India could be an ally or opponent of both".
China’s String of Pearls’ Strategy
The post-Cold War developments in the Indian Ocean must also be taken into account in tracing the importance of the Indian Ocean frontier for the emerging South Asian security architecture. Since the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the United States with its up-graded Diego Garcia base remains the main extra-regional naval power in the Indian Ocean. Nevertheless, the Indian Ocean is not moving towards a single-power hegemonic stability based on US naval power. In addition to India, some other regional and extra-regional powers including Thailand, Indonesia, Australia, Iran, South Africa and more importantly China and Japan have emerged as powers with Indian Ocean blue water capacity. The most important development, with serious implications, would be the increasing entry of the Chinese Navy into the Indian Ocean with its phenomenal economic growth. Today, China claims the world’s second largest GDP surpassing Japan and comes forward to influence the reshaping of global commerce. China is the world’s third largest oil market, following the United States and Japan. It is also the world’s largest consumer of iron ore, surpassing even Japan. WTO rates China as the fourth largest merchandise trader. China’s increasing naval presence is manifested in its ‘string of pearls’ strategy’. It includes China’s port projects in Gwadar in Pakistan, Hambantota in Sri Lanka, Chittagong in Bangladesh, Laem Chabang in Myanmar and Sihanoukville in Campuchia. China always remains a factor in South Asian regional security dynamics. The advances in economic and military spears of both powers have changed the parameters of their operation. The Indian blue water naval reach and punch and China’s ‘string of Pearls strategy’ bring the Indian Ocean dynamics more prominently into the South Asian security architecture. The changes in Japan’s foreign policy after 1991 which emphasized enhanced regional role should also be taken into account. At the ASEAN Pre-Ministerial Conference in 1991 Japanese Foreign Minister Nakayama proposed a security dialogue among regional countries on a multi-lateral setting. The multi-tiered approach of the Nakayama proposal in effect indicated the involvement in promoting multilateral regional security arrangements. It expected to widen Japan’s security parameters incorporating the wider Indian Ocean region by identifying different levels and types of defensive cooperation and coordination at bi-lateral, multi-lateral and sub-regional levels. In the 1990s, Japan extended its new political-diplomatic initiatives with direct involvement in conflict-management and peace building activities in Afghanistan, East Timor, war-torn Aceh in Indonesia, and Southern Mindanao in the Philippines. Accordingly, in an address at the Tokyo Press Club in December 2002, Akashi referred to ‘a new phase of Japanese diplomacy’ in Asia. In addition, the ‘China factor’ in Japan’s foreign policy enhanced the importance of South Asia in its foreign and defense policy projections. In this context, strategic relationship among the United States, China, India and Japan remains an important factor in the Indian Ocean.
It is also important to view these developments against the backdrop of changes brought about by the process of Globalization and the changed perception of security with new threats and vulnerabilities. In the face of an intense global flow of goods, services and finance and other forces set in motion by the Globalization, ‘hard politics’ is increasingly losing its earlier vigour as states are now more interested in wealth acquisition through economic liberalization and trade. At the same time, with the thaw of Cold War mind-set, the narrow definition of security which focuses mainly on territorial integrity from external threats is found to be inadequate in the face of new threat scenarios.
Continued on next Wednesday
